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In early April 2003, the invasion of Iraq, which had commenced less than three weeks prior, reached a decisive moment at the gates of Baghdad. While coalition air power had dominated the skies and ground forces had advanced rapidly from the south, the ultimate test lay in confronting Saddam Hussein’s regime in its heavily defended capital. Conventional military wisdom suggested a cautious, methodical approach to urban warfare, potentially involving a protracted siege to minimize casualties. However, commanders of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) opted for a daring and unconventional tactic: armored thrusts directly into the heart of the city, which came to be known as the "Thunder Runs." These audacious maneuvers on April 5th and April 7th, 2003, proved to be pivotal in the collapse of the Iraqi regime in Baghdad.
Background - The Advance on the Capital
By April 3rd, 2003, elements of the 3rd Infantry Division, under the command of Major General Buford Blount III, had fought their way to the southwestern outskirts of Baghdad, securing the international airport, subsequently renamed Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) by U.S. forces. The primary unit at the forefront of this advance was Colonel David Perkins’ 2nd Brigade Combat Team (2BCT). The initial expectation among some U.S. planners was that securing the airport might trigger a capitulation of the regime or at least severely demoralize its defenders. However, Iraqi resistance, though sporadic in some areas, continued, particularly from Fedayeen Saddam irregular forces and elements of the Special Republican Guard.
The challenge was how to tackle a city of over five million people, defended by a mix of conventional military units and paramilitary fighters, without getting bogged down in a costly, street-by-street urban battle. The memory of past urban engagements, such as Mogadishu in 1993 or Grozny in 1994-1995, loomed large, highlighting the risks to armored vehicles and infantry in dense urban terrain against a determined enemy.
The First Thunder Run: April 5th, 2003 – A Reconnaissance in Force
The idea for an armored probe into Baghdad originated from a desire to assess enemy strength, test their reactions, and demonstrate U.S. capability and resolve. Colonel Perkins, commanding the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, advocated for this aggressive reconnaissance. The mission, assigned to Task Force 1-64 Armor, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eric Wesley, part of Perkins' brigade, was to conduct a high-speed raid from the airport, through major southern city arteries (Highway 8), into central Baghdad, before returning to the airport.
Early on the morning of April 5th, a column of approximately 29 M1 Abrams main battle tanks, 14 M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and support vehicles (such as M113s and M88 recovery vehicles) rolled out from the airport perimeter. Their movement was swift, utilizing the speed and shock effect of the heavy armor. The column encountered significant resistance almost immediately after entering the urbanized areas. Iraqi forces, primarily Fedayeen fighters and some Republican Guard remnants, engaged the American armor with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), small arms fire, and mortars. These attacks often came from rooftops, alleyways, and prepared defensive positions.
The U.S. tankers and Bradley crews responded with overwhelming firepower, utilizing machine guns, 25mm cannons, and the Abrams’ 120mm main guns. Close air support from A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft and attack helicopters also played a crucial role in suppressing enemy positions identified by the ground column. Despite the heavy resistance, the task force successfully navigated approximately 12 miles of urban terrain, reaching key intersections and government districts in southern and central Baghdad.
The raid was not without cost. Several vehicles sustained damage, primarily from RPGs, though the heavy armor of the M1 Abrams tanks proved highly resilient. One M1 Abrams was disabled by an RPG or possible anti-tank mine, requiring recovery efforts under fire. The crew, however, was unharmed. U.S. casualties for this first run were relatively light given the intensity of the fighting, with reports of a few wounded. Iraqi casualties were estimated to be significantly higher. After several hours of intense fighting and having gathered valuable intelligence on defensive setups and the nature of the opposition, TF 1-64 Armor executed a fighting withdrawal, returning to the relative safety of the airport by midday.
The first Thunder Run achieved its objectives: it demonstrated that U.S. armor could penetrate deep into Baghdad and survive, it unnerved Iraqi leadership, and it provided crucial intelligence. It also showed that while Iraqi defenses were not impenetrable, they were determined and capable of inflicting damage, especially against lighter vehicles or dismounted infantry if they were to be isolated.
Decision for a Second, Decisive Run
The success and survivability of the April 5th raid emboldened U.S. commanders. Intelligence, including signals intercepts, indicated that the Iraqi regime was shocked and disoriented by the American armor’s ability to punch into the city. Colonel Perkins, supported by Major General Blount and V Corps commander Lieutenant General William Wallace, argued that instead of merely repeating raids, they should seize and hold ground within the city itself. The plan was to conduct another, more powerful Thunder Run, this time with the objective of occupying key government sites in central Baghdad, effectively decapitating the regime’s central control.
This was a riskier proposition. While the first run had the advantage of surprise and a planned withdrawal, a sustained presence would mean U.S. forces would be deep within a hostile city, potentially surrounded, and reliant on contested supply lines.
The Second Thunder Run: April 7th, 2003 – Seizing the Heart of the Regime
On the morning of April 7th, 2003, Colonel Perkins personally led his entire 2nd Brigade Combat Team on the second Thunder Run. This was a much larger force than the first, comprising nearly 800 soldiers in approximately 60 M1 Abrams tanks, 60 M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and numerous support vehicles. Their objective was to fight their way back into central Baghdad along Highway 8 and seize key Ba'ath Party headquarters, presidential palaces, and government buildings, establishing a secure lodgment.
The resistance encountered on April 7th was initially even fiercer than that on April 5th. Iraqi forces, having learned from the first raid, had prepared more elaborate ambushes. They utilized suicide bombers (including car bombs and individuals with explosive vests), RPGs, anti-tank guided missiles, mortars, artillery, and small arms fire. Many fighters were positioned in multi-story buildings and along highway overpasses, creating kill zones.
The fighting was intense and chaotic. U.S. forces employed combined arms tactics, with tanks providing heavy firepower and protection, Bradleys engaging lighter targets and carrying infantry elements (though most infantry remained mounted due to the intensity of fire), and engineers working to clear obstacles. Communications were vital, as was the discipline of the U.S. troops who maintained fire control and maneuvered under extreme pressure. Close air support was again critical in suppressing enemy strongpoints and artillery.
One of the most critical engagements occurred at the junction of Highways 8 and 10, known as Objective CURLY, and further north at Objective LARRY and MOE, which corresponded to key government buildings and palace complexes. Despite numerous RPG hits on Abrams tanks, none were catastrophically destroyed, though some suffered mobility kills or damage to external systems. Bradley Fighting Vehicles, while more vulnerable, also performed well, their 25mm cannons proving effective in urban combat.
By late afternoon on April 7th, after hours of relentless combat, the 2nd Brigade had successfully fought its way into central Baghdad and secured several key presidential palaces along the Tigris River. This area, part of the heavily fortified "Green Zone," became the brigade's initial defensive perimeter. Unlike the first Thunder Run, this time the Americans were there to stay.
Iraqi Resistance and Tactics
Iraqi resistance during the Thunder Runs was a mix of desperation and tactical ingenuity, albeit ultimately overwhelmed by U.S. firepower and armor. Fedayeen Saddam paramilitaries, often fighting in civilian clothes or irregular uniforms, proved to be tenacious. They utilized the urban landscape for cover and concealment, launching ambushes from close range. Their primary anti-armor weapon was the RPG-7, which, while generally ineffective against the frontal armor of an M1 Abrams, could damage tracks, optics, and external equipment, and was more dangerous to Bradleys and support vehicles.
There were instances of coordinated attacks, with Iraqi forces attempting to draw U.S. vehicles into kill zones where they could be engaged from multiple directions, including from rooftops and prepared positions in buildings. Suicide attacks, using both vehicles and individuals, were a new and disturbing element that U.S. forces had to contend with. Despite their bravery and fanaticism in some cases, these forces lacked the command and control, combined arms capability, and protected mobility to effectively counter the U.S. armored columns.
Casualties and Costs
The Thunder Runs were not without cost to U.S. forces, though casualties were considered remarkably light given the audacity of the operations and the intensity of the urban combat. During the April 7th operation, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team suffered approximately two soldiers killed, dozens wounded, and two M1 Abrams tanks rendered combat ineffective (though recoverable). Several other tanks and Bradleys sustained varying degrees of damage but remained operational or were quickly repaired.
Iraqi losses were far more substantial. It is estimated that hundreds, possibly thousands, of Iraqi fighters were killed during the two Thunder Runs. The U.S. forces’ superior firepower, training, and armored protection proved decisive in these engagements. The psychological impact of seeing American tanks patrolling the centers of power in Baghdad also contributed to the erosion of morale among remaining Iraqi forces.
Impact and Aftermath
The strategic and psychological impact of the Thunder Runs, particularly the second one on April 7th, was profound. The seizure of Saddam Hussein's main presidential palace complex and other key government buildings by U.S. forces signaled the imminent collapse of the regime. With American tanks firmly entrenched in the heart of the capital, the illusion of centralized Iraqi control evaporated.
These actions effectively broke the back of organized resistance in Baghdad. While the pockets of fighting continued for several more days, the regime’s ability to command and coordinate its forces was shattered. On April 9th, 2003, two days after the 2nd Brigade established its foothold, the iconic statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square was toppled, an event broadcast worldwide that symbolized the end of his rule.
The Thunder Runs were hailed as a brilliant operational maneuver, showcasing the U.S. Army's adaptability and the effectiveness of its heavy armored forces even in a complex urban environment when used boldly. They demonstrated a willingness to accept calculated risks to achieve decisive results, thereby potentially shortening the overall conflict in Baghdad and avoiding a prolonged and bloodier siege.
The Baghdad Thunder Runs of April 2003 stand as a significant feat of arms in modern military history. They were a gamble, a deviation from conventional doctrine for urban warfare, but one that paid off strategically. Led by commanders willing to take risks and executed by well-trained and well-equipped soldiers, these armored thrusts exploited the weaknesses of the Iraqi defenses and delivered a decisive psychological and physical blow to Saddam Hussein's regime. While the subsequent insurgency and long-term challenges in Iraq would prove far more complex, the Thunder Runs were instrumental in the rapid seizure of the Iraqi capital, marking a crucial turning point in the 2003 invasion.
